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The Federal Antitrust Implications of
Local Rent Control: A Plaintiff's Primer
STEVEN G. CHURCHWELL*
The proliferation of rent control laws in many California cities has led to a
furious debate concerning its legal, economic, and social consequences. Lead-
ing scholars believe that rent control only exacerbates existing housing
shortages and excludes the poor, the minority and the elderly from scarce
rental housing. This article sets forth the proposition that the fixing of rent
ceilings by a local government violates the federal antitrust laws and can be
invalidated in federal court.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rent controls in some form have existed in this country for several
decades.' The recent tenants' rights movements in places such as
Santa Monica, California, however, have produced much more re-
strictive rent control laws2 with a corresponding determination by
landlords to find legal means to overturn or weaken these measures. 3
One cause of action that has been discussed often but pursued only
recently is a federal lawsuit alleging antitrust violations.4 Only since
1982 has a majority of the United States Supreme Court allowed local
governments to be sued in antitrust.5 The specter of treble damages
* B.A., Vanderbilt Univ.; J.D., Univ. of Tennessee. Member, Tennessee and Cal-
ifornia Bar Associations. This article was written as part of the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion's postgraduate fellowship in public interest law.
1. New York City first passed a rent control program in 1942 as a "temporary"
measure. Dienstfrey, The Politics of Rent Control in the United States: A Program at
the Yellow Light, in RENT CONTROL MYTHS & REALITIES 5 (1981).
2. Santa Monica has "the nation's toughest and most controversial rent-control
law." L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, (Metro) at 1, col. 1.
3. "Santa Monica apartment owners consider rent control an anathema. Citing
recent court decisions that removed the rent control board's authority to impose fines
and set its own budget, they say they are even more determined to overturn the law."
Id. at 1, col. 4.
4. The Clayton Act of 1914 allows a private party to enforce the antitrust laws
and recover treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
5. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
See discussion infra notes 115-65 and accompanying text. Actually, in 1978, a plurality
of the Court had agreed that cities did not enjoy antitrust immunity coextensive with
has led some to believe that either Congress,6 the courts, or state leg-
islatures will eventually provide protection from Sherman Act7 liabil-
ity for local governments.8
There is little doubt that a state legislature could provide munici-
pal immunity from Sherman Act liability by passing a statute that
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"9 a state policy in
favor of rent control.10 What is unclear is whether an activist court
could provide state action immunity by finding such a policy ex-
pressed in housing legislation, for example, or even in other court
decisions.
The California Supreme Court did not reach the immunity issue in
Fisher v. City of Berkeley,l although it did address whether the
Sherman Act preempted the Berkeley, California rent control ordi-
nance. During briefing by the parties and amici curiae, the California
Supreme Court by letter asked counsel to address several questions
regarding, inter alia, the Noerr doctrine,' 2 "inter-enterprise" conspir-
acies,13 and traditional rules of liability.J4 The court's opinion in
Fisher is devoted in large part to the antitrust question, but because
the court decided that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the
ordinance unreasonably restrained trade,i5 the court limited its dis-
cussion to a review on the rule of liability.16
Because of the Fisher court's rejection of both the per se illegality
and Rule of Reason tests, its discussion of the Sherman Act's applica-
tion to the rent control law can be considered a curiosity. Neverthe-
that of the states. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978).
6. Congress has acted to provide such protection with the passage of "Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Act of 1984." See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Civiletti, The Fallout From Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder: Prospects For A Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 379 (1983).
9. See, e.g., notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
10. It is an open question as to whether the policy would have to clearly sanction
the anticompetitive effects of rent control or merely legislate on the subject. See, e.g.,
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted 52
U.S.L.W. 3891 (June 11, 1984) (Sherman Act immunity afforded city even though state
legislature did not approve anticompetitive result of authorized waste treatment).
11. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1984). Defendants argued that the necessary state policy did exist in California legis-
lation, evidenced by the language in Health and Safety Code sections 50003 and 50005,
entreating local governments to assist in providing a "'decent home and suitable living
environment for every California family.'" I& at 714, 693 P.2d at 315, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
736 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 50003, 50005 (West
1979)).
12. See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
16. See Letter from Supreme Court of California to counsel in Fisher (Feb. 15,
1985) (requesting additional supplemental briefs).
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less, the decision is discussed in this article because it is the court's
very avoidance of the traditional rules of liability that provide hope
to plaintiffs attacking a rent control ordinance in federal court.
Until this area of the law is settled by the courts, there are some
established principles that can provide guidance to one bringing suit
against a municipality for violating the antitrust laws through imposi-
tion of rent controls. This article will address the issue of whether
the Sherman Act provides a viable avenue of attack against existing
rent control laws. For the benefit of those who have little or no
background in antitrust law, this article will examine basic antitrust
principles and how practitioners may apply them.
II. THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN GENERAL
A. Background of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act 17 was passed by the United States
Congress in 1890 and was designed to prohibit restraint of tradels and
monopolization of markets 19 in interstate commerce. Even though
the legislative history of the Act indicates the desire of Congress to
merely supplement state antitrust laws,20 the predictable broadening
of the federal commerce power by the United States Supreme
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
18. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract
or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and; on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
19. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years,
or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id, § 2.
20. The legislative record from the House states: "Whatever legislation Congress
may enact on this subject, within the limits of its authority, will prove of little value
unless the States shall supplement it by such auxiliary and proper legislation as may
be within their legislative authority." H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890).
Court 2l led to the inclusion of many wholly intrastate activities
within the net of federal antitrust liability.22 The effect of these deci-
sions was to leave many states open to federal antitrust liability due
to the Court's all-encompassing view of interstate commerce.
Eventually, this led in 1943 to a judicially-created 23 immunity for
states known as the "state action doctrine."24 This ironclad protec-
tion given to states did little to reassure municipalities 2 5 that they
would be given the same immunity from the potentially devastating
treble damage awards provided for in the Clayton Act of 1914 for vio-
lations of the antitrust statutes. 26 Local governments' worst fears
were realized in the landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Community Communications Company v. City of Boul-
der.27 In Boulder, a majority refused to equate municipal activity
with state action, finding that a state could provide antitrust immu-
nity to local governmental entities only by a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy" in favor of the anticompetitive
activity.
28
Thus, disgruntled bidders for city contracts and franchises, land-
lords subject to rent controls and, potentially, numerous other plain-
tiffs were now armed for battle in the federal courts. The only
question remaining was the limit of the local government's new-
found liability.
B. Judicial Application of the Sherman Act
The aim of Congress in enacting the Sherman Act of 1890 was to
21. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
22. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2
(1976), reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 512 (1983).
23. Statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws are quite common. For example,
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982) exempts state regulation of insurance companies from any
"Act of Congress."
24. The seminal decision that set forth the state action doctrine was Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a detailed discussion of what has become known as
"Parker immunity," see infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text.
25. See generally Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Laqfayette,
95 HARv. L. REV. 435 (1981).
26. The Clayton Act encompasses 16 sections in title 15 of the United States Code.
Section 15 provides in part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall re-
cover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
27. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). For a discussion of the Boulder decision, see infra notes
133-38 and accompanying text.
28. 455 U.S. at 52.
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promote "full and free competition" in the marketplace. 29 The
United States Supreme Court stated in 1958 that
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.3 0
This policy has, as could be expected, been the subject of varying de-
grees of judicial interpretation and enforcement, but the basic resolve
of the federal courts to promote unfettered competition has remained
unchanged through the years. To understand why local rent controls
violate the Sherman Act, one must first understand the basic rules
regarding the courts' application of sections one and two of the Act.
1. The Rule of Reason
For the first twenty years, the courts interpreted the Sherman Act
quite literally. "Every" restraint of trade or monopoly was con-
demned under the antitrust laws. In United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association,3 ' the United States Supreme Court held that
"[t]o say ... that the [Sherman] Act excludes agreements which are
not in unreasonable restraint of trade . . .is substantially to leave
the question of reasonableness to the companies themselves."3 2
This remained the law until 1911 when the Court decided Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States.3 3 The justices decided
that the "standard of reason" applied to restraints of trade or at-
tempts to monopolize and thereby adopted the Rule of Reason.34
Only unreasonable restraints of trade or monopolies have been con-
demned since Standard OiL 35
29. See S. 344, 50th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1888); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competi-
tion"). For an excellent treatment of the legislative history of the Act, see Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
30. 356 U.S. at 4.
31. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
32. Id. at 332.
33. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. Id. at 59-62. The Court's adoption of the Rule of Reason was lambasted by Jus-
tice Harlan as an act of judicial legislation. Id. at 87-88 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). One interesting note is that adoption of the Rule of Reason
was superfluous in the Standard Oil decision because the huge trust before the Court
clearly constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. See Levi, The Antitrust Laws
and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 158 (1947).
35. See Lawson v. Woodmere, 217 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1954). Certain antitrust
activity is deemed "unreasonable per se." See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying
text.
The Rule of Reason has been subject to many deviations from the
strict standard of competition in its application by the Supreme Court
over the years. The Court in Standard Oil failed to provide any gui-
dance concerning the factors that should be considered in determin-
ing which monopolies or restraints of trade were reasonable.
Eventually Justice Brandeis, in writing for the majority in Board of
Trade v. United States,36 set forth a clear articulation of the analysis
required to apply the Rule of Reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.3 7
This analysis appeared to bring social benefits of restraints of trade
into the balance. This was confusing because the Standard Oil Court
had made it clear that once an arrangement substantially restricted
competition, nothing more would have to be proved to establish a vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.38 Therefore, the deviation in Board of
Trade could be considered an anomaly because of the decision's reli-
ance on noncompetitive factors. However, later decisions also consid-
ered social factors in rejecting antitrust claims. 3 9
Nonetheless, current Rule of Reason analysis would appear to be
strictly limited to consideration of competition without a moral in-
quiry. For example, in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,40 the United States Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment of engineers that their canon of ethics prohibiting competitive
bidding was reasonable since competition in bidding could result in a
decrease in quality, with a corresponding danger to the safety of the
public. 4 1 The Court stated that the correct focus of inquiry was not a
practice's reasonableness, but rather its "impact on competitive
36. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
37. Id. at 238.
38. 221 U.S. at 65. The standard against which business practice was measured in
Standard Oil was competition. The Court stated that the agreements there were:
clearly restraints of trade within the purview of the statute, they could not be
taken out of that category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expedi-
ency or non-expediency of having made the contracts or the wisdom or want
of wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made.
Id.
39. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (exclu-
sive sales agency contracts between coal producers and defendant upheld against back-
drop of Great Depression's bankruptcies and decreasing wages).
40. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
41. The Court deemed the engineers' defense a "fundamental misunderstanding of
the Rule of Reason." Id. at 681.
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conditions."42
2. The Per Se Doctrine
Even though the courts' duty in enforcing the Sherman Act in-
volves a relatively narrow question of law, viz., the impact on compe-
tition of the alleged restraint of trade, the courts must, nonetheless,
consider several factors before rendering a decision. These include:
(1) the power of the defendant "in the relevant product and geo-
graphic markets,"43 (2) whether there exist less restrictive alterna-
tives to the restraint,44 and (3) possible redeeming economic virtues
of the restraint.45
The complexity of this procedure, as well as the belief that some
restraints are inherently evil because they always eliminate or reduce
competition, led the Court to declare some arrangements illegal per
se.46 The breadth of the doctrine is apparent from the famous state-
ment made in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company:47
"Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se. "48 The Sherman Act's purpose was to allow the market, not
the courts, to determine prices. Therefore, it was believed, the Rule
of Reason could not be effective in areas such as price-fixing because
the courts would have to set reasonable price levels.
Therefore, the per se doctrine clearly outlaws horizontal price-fix-
ing.49 The bipartite test utilized by the courts before invoking the
per se rule is: (1) the presence of an anticompetitive effect on the
marketplace involved,50 and (2) the probability that maintenance of
the restraint will lead to control of the market by the defendant.51
42. Id at 688.
43. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137,
1143 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
44. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976), cert
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
45. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
46. The per se rule is aimed at punishing horizontal restraints of trade under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. See generally Rahi, Price Competition and the Price Fix-
ing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 137 (1962).
47. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
48. Id. at 223.
49. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
50. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
51. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312
U.S. 457, 407 (1941). Market control that leads to monopolization is the main target of
the per se doctrine. See 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW § 8.3, at 369 (1980)
The imposition of rent controls by a municipality meets both parts
of the test and is clearly a per se violation of the federal antitrust
laws. The setting of a maximum price for a commodity is perhaps
one of the clearest examples of price-fixing. 52 The fact that rent con-
trol falls within the per se category, however, does not end the in-
quiry. Before examining a city's defenses to a section one violation,
section two of the Sherman Act should be studied.
C. Monopoly Power
When one thinks of monopolies, perhaps the old Bell Telephone
system comes to mind most readily. One's uneducated guess concern-
ing what constitutes the offense of monopolization prohibited by sec-
tion two of the Sherman Act53 is probably not far from the mark.
The test set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell
Corp.5 4 requires the presence of two elements: (1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the intent to acquire
or maintain that power.55 However, possession of "monopoly power"
that violates section two necessarily involves a question of degree.
Herein lies the difficult part of the application of the section. The
quantum of power possessed by the defendant within the relevant
market must be examined.56 Moreover, it is unclear what type of
conduct by the defendant will satisfy the intent requirement of the
second part of the test.
The first part of the test, monopoly power, may be defined as the
power to control prices or to unreasonably exclude competition.5 7
Traditionally, courts have examined market share of the defendant
in the relevant product and geographic markets.58 Definition of
these markets is of the utmost importance to the plaintiff, because
the larger the market, the larger the defendant's share will have to
be for the plaintiff to prove the existence of monopoly power.5 9
("Those are the types of restraints which are most antagonistic to the underlying poli-
cies of the Sherman Act.").
52. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
see also Rahl, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing--Sans Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 837 (1952).
53. See supra note 19.
54. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
55. Id. at 570-71.. See also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586, 592 (1957).
56. See III P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAw 600b (1978). See also Note,
Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act. Defendant's Market Power As a Req-
uisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1451 (1973).
57. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 806 (1946).
58. See, e.g., Indiana Farmer's Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S.
268, 279 (1934).
59. For example, in the often-cited decision of EL. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 377, the
Court found that du Pont controlled 75% of the cellophane market, but that the rele-
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In attacking a rent control law, the plaintiff may attempt to prove
the defendant's possession of monopoly power by direct evidence 60 of
the control of prices (e.g., the relevant rent control law) or the exclu-
sion of competitors (e.g., establishment of a rent control law board
with exclusive power to adjust rents). More likely than not, how-
ever, the judge will require that evidence of the defendant's market
power be presented. Hence, the following discussion.
1. The Relevant Markets
a. The Geographic Market.
The relevant geographic market for purposes of attacking a rent
control law is the area included in the jurisdiction enacting rent con-
trols (e.g., Los Angeles County or the City of Berkeley) and a sur-
rounding area bounded by perhaps the general community. In other
words, the relevant market includes the geographic area of effective
competition.6 1 For example, an exclusive coastal city such as Santa
Monica might compete for renters within only a small area, including
perhaps Venice and Marina Del Rey. This is because it is much less
desirable to live in neighboring West Los Angeles, and another
neighboring area, Pacific Palisades, is almost exclusively made up of
very expensive, single family residences.
The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish a specified
area as the relevant geographic market.6 2 Normally a "reasonable
approximation" of the market will suffice.6 3 The formula utilized by
the courts is not susceptible to any easy test. In finding a rather
small relevant geographic market, the United States Supreme Court
opined in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 64 that
vant market included all flexible packaging materials (e.g., aluminum foil). Therefore,
the Court found no monopoly power because du Pont only controlled 17.9% of the
larger, "relevant" market. Id. at 405.
60. "Even in the absence of empirical proof of market shares (usually the best in-
dicator of monopoly power), the requisite power also can be demonstrated by evidence
of the exercise of actual control over prices or exclusion of competitors." Moore v.
James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
682 F.2d 830 (1982) (citation omitted). See also General Communications Eng'g, Inc. v.
Motorola Communications & Elec., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (quoting
Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12-13 (9th Cir. 1973), cert denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974)).
61. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-39 (1962); Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
62. United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp. 903, 909 (W.D. Mo. 1975),
affd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1976).
63. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 619 (1974).
64. 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Clayton Act section 7).
[w]here, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect. . . on competition
will be direct and immediate .... the "area of effective competition in the
known line of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market
area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practically
turn for supplies .... -65
In terms of monopolization of the rental housing market by a city
that has imposed rent control, this means an area encompassing all of
the tenants in an area to whom city landlords could expect to rent
housing.
Apart from the vague outer limits of the market area, courts some-
times seem willing to go further and use a well-defined submarket.66
A plaintiff would do well to argue that this submarket is restricted to
the city itself. Thus, the relevant geographic market in an antitrust
suit against the Santa Monica Rent Control Board would be Santa
Monica alone. This is because, realistically, rent control has reduced
the vacancy rate to the point where there is no competition for ten-
ants at all, including those from outside the area. With no tenant
movement, and the stranglehold on competition possessed by the
city, the city itself would appear to be the relevant geographic
market.
b. The Relevant Product Market.
The relevant product market may be defined as the market in
which the defendant's goods or services compete.67 The relevant
product market is composed of all commodities reasonably inter-
changeable by consumers for the same use.6 8 For example, a city de-
fendant in an antitrust suit against a rent control law could argue
that all housing, not just rental housing, would be the relevant prod-
uct market. This argument would probably not carry much weight.
There are few similarities between the high cost of a townhome in
Santa Monica and the controlled rent for a similar apartment. Rent
control itself creates a unique product. Also, because cities with rent
control laws generally have a large percentage of rental housing,69
even if all housing is declared the relevant product market, the city
probably monopolized a large enough share (all rental housing) to
constitute monopoly power for section two purposes.
To summarize, rent control could be found to constitute monopoly
65. Id. at 357, 359 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
66. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967).
67. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 395-96.
68. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325. Besides interchangeability of use between the
defendant's product and substitutes of competitors, the Court listed: (1) industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity; (2) the product's pe-
culiar characteristics and uses; (3) unique production facilities; (4) distinct customers;
(5) distinct prices; (6) sensitivity to price changes; and (7) specialized vendors. Id.
69. Otherwise tenants do not have the necessary political power to enact a rent
control law.
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power under the test set forth in United States v. Grinnell Corp.70
because the municipality itself could be considered the relevant geo-
graphic area, and the relevant product market would be rental hous-
ing over which the city has 100% control. Thus, only the intent
requirement is left to be dealt with.
2. Intent to Monopolize
The second part of the offense of monopolization is intent to mo-
nopolize. 71 The intent required is a "general" intent.72 The case law
on this point is confusing and the language often misleading.73 The
simplest way to understand the requirement is to realize that the
court utilizes evidence concerning the defendant's conduct to evalu-
ate the anticompetitive nature of the alleged monopoly. The court is
interested in consequences, not what the defendant set out to
accomplish. 74
In the arena of rent control laws, the proof of intent should be
quite simple to present. First, proof that the defendant intended to
engage in the particular act would involve proving passage of the or-
dinance or initiative establishing rent control. Second, it must be
proved that this act (not illegal in itself) resulted in acquisition of
monopoly power by the defendant. This would be evidenced by lan-
guage in the rent control law providing for a rent "freeze" or
"rollback" and the raising of rents only under specified
circumstances.
Basically, pleading a section two monopoly violation makes good
sense for the plaintiff because there is no combination, contract, or
conspiracy requirement as there is under section one of the Sherman
Act.75 Rent control laws give the city monopoly power in the rele-
vant market; and the city willfully acquires that power through pas-
70. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
71. Id.
72. General intent can be defined as the intent to do the acts that result in a mo-
nopoly. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953). Spe-
cific intent is required to prove an attempt to monopolize under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, but mere general intent is required where the monopoly is already in
place. Id. To read section 2 as demanding any "specific" intent makes nonsense of it,
"for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing .... United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945), quoted in 345 U.S. at 626.
73. See 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRusT LAW § 12.11 (1980).
74. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
75. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948), overruled by Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). See also inra note 78 and
accompanying text.
sage of an initiative or ordinance. This constitutes illegal
monopolization under the Sherman Act.
III. THE NEED FOR A "CONTRACT, COMBINATION, OR CONSPIRACY"
UNDER SECTION ONE
It is interesting to note that of the seven questions addressed to
counsel in the Fisher v. City of Berkeley case by the California
Supreme Court in a letter requesting additional briefings, all but one
dealt with various aspects of the Sherman Act, section 1, requirement
of a "contract, combination, or conspiracy." 76 Along with a plea of
Parker immunity,77 municipal defendants will ground their defense
upon this requirement.
Section one of the Sherman Act requires concerted action,78 while
independent action by a single entity or person may result in a sec-
tion two monopolization violation. Thus, the following discussion
76. It is interesting to note that of the seven questions addressed to counsel in the
Fisher case (in a letter from the California Supreme Court), all but one dealt with var-
ious aspects of the section one Sherman Act requirement of a "contract, combination,
or conspiracy." Letter from clerk of the California Supreme Court Counsel in Fisher
(Feb. 15, 1985) (requesting supplemental briefs concerning antitrust scrutiny of Berke-
ley rent control ordinance). The questions were:
1. If the alleged "contract, combination, or conspiracy" required to be
proved under section 1 of the Sherman Act is viewed. as having occurred
among the named defendants, what effect, if any, should be given regarding
the so-called "inter-enterprise" or "bathtub" doctrine? (See, e.g., Note, "Con-
spiring Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (1982) 95 Harv.L.Rev.
661; Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities under the Antitrust Laws: Litiga-
tion Strategies (1983) 32 U.Cath.L.Rev. 395, 401-403.)
2. If the alleged "contract, combination, or conspiracy" is viewed as having
occurred between the named defendants and third parties (i.e., between the
named defendants on the one hand,. and the ordinance proponents and the
voters on the other):
(a) What evidence inthe record sheds light on the role of the initiative pro-
ponents in the enactment of the ordinance? Is there any evidence in the rec-
ord indicating by what process the ordinance was placed on the ballot?
(b) What effect, if any, should be given the Noerr doctrine (Eastern Rail-
road Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. (1961) 365 U.S. 127)
in relation to the "third parties'" conduct?
(c) Assuming arguendo that the "third parties'" conduct is protected under
Noerr and its progeny, should the third parties' "privilege" vitiate the alleged
"conspiracy" between the named defendants and the third parties?
(d) Can the legitimate acts of third parties in promoting and voting for rent
control, together with the named defendants' actions undertaken pursuant to
the third parties' conduct, be considered to constitute a "contract, combination
or conspiracy" under section 1 of the Sherman Act?
3. Assuming arguendo plaintiffs can establish as a matter of law that on
these facts a "contract, combination, or conspiracy" exists, and that the al-
leged restraint affects interstate commerce, should traditional rules of anti-
trust liability govern this facial attack on the ordinance?
Id.
77. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
78. The legal distinction for Sherman Act purposes among a contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy is negligible. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST § 109 (1977).
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will address only the need for proving concerted action under section
one and how to prove it in federal court.
A. Evidence of a Conspiracy
Proving that a conspiracy occurred to put rent controls into place
in a city will be relatively easy. Courts require a low threshold of
proof to meet this section one requirement. An express agreement
need not be shown.79 The United States Supreme Court stated in In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,8 0 that to establish a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act it is sufficient to show "[a]cceptance by com-
petitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate
in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is re-
straint of interstate commerce. .... ,,81
The central issue is not whether a conspiracy to restrain competi-
tion existed, but whether the actors involved were: (1) both part of
the same entity and thus incapable of conspiring under the "bathtub"
doctrine,8 2 or (2) incapable of conspiring under the Noerr doctrine83
because they were petitioning for government action. A plaintiff
should not, however, neglect developing the legislative history of the
ordinance or charter amendment. Discovery in this area will be cru-
cial and every possible way to show a conspiracy should be explored
without regard to the legal exceptions. The goal is to lead the finder
of fact to the conclusion that two independent parties combined to
eliminate competition in the relevant rental housing market.
B. The Noerr Doctrine: Can It Eliminate the Existence of a
Conspiracy for Sherman Act Purposes?
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,8 4 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a case in which
twenty-four railroads had engaged in an underhanded smear cam-
paign against long-distance trucking companies.85 The trucking com-
panies' complaint alleged violation of the Sherman Act. The
79. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (enough
that defendants contemplate concerted action and then conform to that arrangement).
80. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
81. Id at 227.
82. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. For example, can a city conspire
with a city council? Can a rent board conspire with the city?
83. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961). The defenses are discussed infra in notes 106-14.
84. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
85. Id at 129-30.
Supreme Court reversed both lower courts, finding no Sherman Act
violation because "the railroads were making a genuine effort to in-
fluence legislation and law enforcement practices."8 6 The Court rea-
soned that "the Sherman Act does not apply . . .[where] activities
comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to
the passage and enforcement of laws."8 7
The Noerr doctrine is limited in scope, but when it is found to ap-
ply, it can deliver a devastating blow to the plaintiff's case. There is
little doubt that the fiercest battle in an antitrust suit against a rent
control law will be fought here. Plaintiffs should emphasize several
points in seeking to limit application of Noerr in the rent control
context.
First, it should be remembered that the railroads' methods, though
ethically indefensible, did not constitute a traditional boycott, price-
fixing, or other recognized unlawful activity. Second, the goal of the
railroads was favorable treatment by the government, and it has long
been settled that seeking favoritism from a state government is pro-
tected.88 Even if the railroads' primary objective was to harm their
competitors through governmental action, the Noerr decision seems
quite reasonable.
It seems clear that the Court did not intend, in granting broad pro-
tections to first amendment activity, to give a blanket exemption to
political solicitation that results in blatant Sherman Act violations. It
is plausible to theorize that the Court did not contemplate Noerr im-
munity for antitrust violations instituted by the government itself.
Parker8 9 immunity had been in place since 1943 for state govern-
ments, and Noerr involved a "commercial" defendant. 90 The consti-
tutional concerns expressed in the Noerr decision could be protected
entirely, and yet the government's acting upon the constituency's de-
mands still subjected them to Sherman Act scrutiny. The Noerr deci-
sion clearly implies this result in stating that no Sherman Act
violation exists "where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is
the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action
.... "91 The Court had no occasion to address the situation where a
86. I& at 144.
87. I& at 138.
88. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52.
89. 317 U.S. at 341 (state government's rights to institute regulatory legislation
which would operate only upon petition and referendum of the parties whose activities
were to be regulated).
90. The Court has seldom dealt with the Sherman Act outside the business con-
text. The Court stated in 1959, just two years before the Noerr decision, that the Sher-
man Act "is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is
applied only to a very limited extent to organizations... which normally have other
objectives." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).
91. 365 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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local government institutes price-fixing in the form of rent controls.
One suspects that Noerr may be distinguishable in that context, even
though the offending law was a result of lobbying, letters, and other
activity protected by the first amendment. Even the reaffirmation in
1965 of the Noerr doctrine in United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington92 did not examine the government's conduct, but only
the petitioner's.93
In light of Overton v. City of Berkeley,94 an antitrust action filed
against the Berkeley rent control law on May 31, 1984, one federal
district court's opinion on how the Noerr doctrine applies in the rent
control context will likely be forthcoming.95 For the present, the
best course would be to examine several theories of proving a con-
spiracy to illegally restrain free competition in the rental market.96
C. The "Bathtub" Doctrine: Another Obstacle for the Plaintiff
Before examining three methods to prove a section one violation of
the Sherman Act, "contract, combination, or conspiracy," the "bath-
tub" exception should be mentioned. The "bathtub" concept inquires
whether two related entities or persons are capable of conspiring
with one another for purposes of the Sherman Act. For example, a
corporation and its officer,97 or a corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, cannot conspire with one another under section one of the
Sherman Act.98
In the realm of municipal governments with rent controls, one im-
portant issue is whether a city government, without involvement of
private citizens, can violate the antitrust laws. Another issue is
whether individual citizens, acting together to pass a rent control law
by initiative, can be considered to have combined for Sherman Act
purposes. Subsection two, below, addresses this point. The following
discussion examines whether the city can be held to have conspired
92. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
93. "Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition." Id at 670.
94. No. C843364SAW (N.D. Cal. filed May 31, 1984).
95. Defendant City of Berkeley filed an answer to the complaint on July 5, 1984.
Discovery is being conducted by both sides. Berkeley presents an interesting Noerr is-
sue because the tenants did not petition the city council to pass the original rent con-
trol law; it was a charter amendment passed by initiative.
96. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
97. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See Copperuwd, 104 S. Ct. at 2731.
with unwilling landlords to restrain prices in the rental housing
market.
1. A Municipal Government May Conspire Within Itself to
Restrain Rent Levels
Because judicial recognition of municipal liability for violations of
federal antitrust laws is a new phenomenon, 99 one must still look to
the Sherman Act's application to businesses for interpretation of the
various provisions. A very lengthy discussion of intraenterprise con-
spiracies was provided by the United States Supreme Court in Cop-
perweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporatio.'oo The
Court held that the coordinated behavior of a parent company and its
subsidiary falls outside the reach of section one.101 The rationale
supporting the decision was that "a parent and a wholly owned subsi-
dary always have a 'unity of purpose or a common design.' "102 The
Court emphasized the rkeed for concerted action to establish a section
one violation and conceded that "the Sherman Act . . .leaves un-
touched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct (short of threatened
monopolization) ".... 103
The issue confronting the bold plaintiff, who is suing a municipal-
ity for instituting rent control, is whether a city can within itself con-
spire to violate section one of the Sherman Act. The answer is yes in
only a limited number of situations.
For example, suppose one attacks a rent control ordinance passed
by a city council. There may have been extensive lobbying by the
public in favor of the ordinance,104 but the city council adopted the
law completely on its own. One issue is whether the Sherman Act
should apply to acts of the individual commissioners who clearly
"combined" to pass the law. The answer is probably no. The correct
analogy there would be to a corporation's board of directors. Each in-
dividual director may have his own agenda with respect to price-com-
petition, but the directors can only act collectively by voting. The
courts do not find the section one requirement of a "contract, combi-
nation, or conspiracy" met merely because two directors decided to
99. See City of Loafyette, 435 U.S. at 389.
100. 104 S. Ct. at 2731.
101. Id at 2741-42 (parent and subsidiary viewed as a single enterprise for purposes
of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
102. Id, at 2742 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810
(1946)).
103. 104 S. Ct. at 2744. City-wide rent control would appear to constitute a clear
violation of section 2.
104. It is doubtful whether private meetings between individual council members
and rent control advocates would be protected under the Noerr doctrine. Such meet-
ings could also result in prosecution for violation of the "open meeting laws" found in
most state codes. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-54961 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
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restrain trade.l05 Similarly then, the fact that a city council adopted
rent controls by ordinance would not seem to constitute a combina-
tion or conspiracy among council members in the antitrust sense.
Perhaps a different situation exists where the city council has no
real authority over rent control, because this power is delegated by
law to an arbitrator106 or independent board.107 In that scenario, the
board and the city council could have such differing goals and inter-
ests that each would qualify as a separate conspirator. For instance,
the council and board could meet in a closed session to discuss with-
holding any rent increase for the following year. That would be
enough to constitute a conspiracy to restrain price competition in the
relevant rental market.
2. Tenants Conspiring with Each Other
A second theory is that tenants, in order to displace competition in
the rental market, conspired with each other to pass rent control by
ballot initiative.'0 8 That is, the tenants took matters into their own
hands and decided among themselves, as individuals, to restrain com-
petition by placing the law on the ballot and then approving it.109
Tenants certainly have some goals in common, but should be consid-
ered individuals who could conspire with one another.
An interesting twist on this would be to plead, in the situation
where council members met with tenants to discuss an initiative, that
the tenants conspired with the city council to bring about rent con-
trol. The protections of the Noerr doctrine would not apply because
the tenants were not exercising their first amendment rights to peti-
tion for governmental action but rather were only seeking advice and
105. See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 642-43 (9th Cir.
1969). A contrary rule would probably bring business to a grinding halt, unable to per-
form routine competitive functions such as marketing or advertising.
106. See WESTMINSTER, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.63.090(B) (1980).
107. For example, Santa Monica and Berkeley, California, each have independently
elected rent control boards. See Charter of the City of Berkeley, art. XVII, § 120
(1980); Santa Monica City Charter, art. XVIII, § 1803(d) (1979). In Santa Monica, the
board has its own legal staff, budget power, and even a lobbyist.
108. Another argument that could be made is that the current tenant conspirators,
in order to gain a competitive edge over future tenants, passed a rent control law that
contains eviction controls and also lowers the vacancy rate. The result is that potential
tenants seeking rental housing in the city must go elsewhere.
109. The Noerr implications of tenants passing a law are not examined in this sec-
tion. The issue is whether a distinction should be drawn between a person or group
petitioning the government for action and passing an initiative in lieu of governmental
action.
aid in passing the law themselves.11O
3. The City May Combine with Affected Landlords to Restrain
Rent Levels
The idea that landlords constitute unwilling co-conspirators with
the city is perhaps hard to accept at first glance."' Nevertheless,
since an antitrust plaintiff suing a municipality necessarily must bor-
row from precedents involving businesses, this is one occasion in
which he should do so heartily.
The "classic" vertical price maintenance arrangement often in-
volves one party who, though unwilling, acquiesces in the anticompe-
titive desires of another party in a distribution ladder. For example,
a manufacturer could refuse to supply goods to a wholesaler who did
not require dealers to charge a minimum price for a product.112 Also,
a manufacturer could combine with an unwilling distributor to main-
tain a minimum price level. For instance, in Albrecht v. Herald
Company,1i 3 the United States Supreme Court stated that an in-
dependent newspaper carrier who refused to comply with the news-
paper's lower advertised price "could have claimed a combination
between respondent [the newspaper] and himself, at least as of the
day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised price."14
The outcome of choosing this theory is that there are no Noerr
problems associated with it. Even though the landlord did not peti-
tion the government for rent control, and the illegal combination oc-
curs without the landlord's consent, there is still a sufficient basis for
a violation of section one of the Sherman Act.
110. If there is an independent rent board, one could also avoid Noer" problems in
this area by utilizing the "co-conspirator" exception to the Noerr doctrine, which states
that activities of governmental officials are not protected if they conspire with private
parties to harm competitors (landlords) of the petitioners (tenants). See Duke & Co. v.
Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). A conspiracy could be established between rent
board members or staff and tenants' rights advocates. Proof could be the divulging of
information to tenants enabling them to sue their landlord or allowing tenants to use
city computers to draft documents. One clear example, it seems, is in Santa Monica
where the rent board legal staff was assisting a private tenant group in drafting a new
rent control charter amendment initiative. Those on the rent board staff who were
caught paid back their salaries for the time spent aiding the private group. That avoids,
perhaps, liability for misuse of public funds, but a conspiracy to restrain rents is con-
clusively established between the rent board and private individuals.
111. This idea was first suggested by Jon D. Smock and Wilbur H. Haines, III, in
their Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae California Apartment Association in Re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's letter to Council of February 15, 1984. Fisher v. City of
Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
112. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1960). "Illegal com-
bination results where manufacturers refuse to deal with wholesalers in order to elicit
their willingness to deny ... products to retailers and thereby help gain the retailer's
adherence to suggested minimum retail prices." Id. at 45.
113. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
114. I at 150 n.6.
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IV. STATE ACTION IMMUNITY: A WEAKENED MUNICIPAL DEFENSE
AT THE CROSSROADS
A. History of the State Action Doctrine
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court held in Parker v.
Brown 115 that a California statute establishing state control over rai-
sin production and wholesale prices upon petition and referendum of
growers was immune from antitrust scrutiny. The Court examined
the language and history of the Sherman Act but could "find nothing
... which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its of-
ficers or agents from activities directed by its legislature."116
Almost thirty years after Parker, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,"n7 the Court held that state action immunity did not protect a
minimum fee schedule enforced by the state bar association.118 The
Court stated that the issue was "whether the activity is required by
the State acting as sovereign."" 9 Noting that the fee schedule had
merely been "prompted" by the state and not "compelled," the Court
found no immunity from the proscriptions of the federal antitrust
1aws.120
In Bates and O'Steen v. State Bar,121 the Court held immune from
an antitrust challenge a disciplinary rule of the Arizona Supreme
Court prohibiting advertising by attorneys. The Court found the rule
to be an "affirmative command" of the state high court and thus
"'compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' "122
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Company,123 the Court made clear that
it had "already decided that state authorization, approval, encourage-
ment, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no anti-
trust immunity."124 It further noted that mere regulation by the
state, even if comprehensive, would not confer immunity from the
115. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
116. Id at 350-51. Actually, the seminal "state action" decision was probably Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), in which the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute
granting a steamboat pilotage monopoly did not violate the Sherman Act because to
rule otherwise would undermine the state's authority to regulate. I& at 344-45.
117. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
118. Id. at 790.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id at 791.
121. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
122. Id. at 360.
123. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
124. Id at 592-93 (footnote omitted).
Sherman Act.125
The latest pronouncement of the Court concerning a state's ability
to confer antitrust immunity on a private party came in 1980 in Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.126 The Court condensed its prior decisions and announced a two-
pronged test for immunity.127 In addition, the Court found that a
uniform price schedule mandated by state statute was not enough to
confer immunity because the state did not "actively supervise" the
essentially private conduct.12s
B. Application of the State Action Doctrine to Municipalities
The Court in 1978 reviewed a case in which a private utility com-
pany counterclaimed against a municipal utility, alleging antitrust vi-
olations. The immunity defense pleaded by the two cities that owned
the utility was rejected by the Court. A four-justice plurality rea-
soned in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Company129
that if cities were granted immunity coextensive with that of the
states, "a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be
introduced. ... 130 The plurality made it clear that a municipality's
activities would only qualify for immunity under Parker when "pur-
suant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or mo-
nopoly public service." 13 ' The authorization from the state, however,
need not be specific and detailed: "[A]n adequate state mandate for
anticompetitive activities of cities and other subordinate governmen-
tal units exists when it is found 'from the authority given a govern-
mental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of.' "132
The Court went further toward lowering the barriers to suing a
municipality in antitrust in Community Communications Company
v. City of Boulder.'3 3 This case involved a cable television franchise's
antitrust suit which sought to enjoin a city with home rule 3 4 powers
125. 1& at 597. "The Court has consistently refused to find that regulation gave rise
to an implied exemption without first determining that exemption was necessary in
order to make the regulatory Act work, 'and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary.' " Id, (footnote omitted).
126. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
127. "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself." Id at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410) (plurality opinion).
128. 445 U.S. at 106.
129. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
130. Id. at 408.
131. Id at 413.
132. Id. at 415 (quoting the decision below, 532 F.2d 431, 434 (1976)).
133. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
134. Home rule authority gives a city all of the state legislative power with respect
to municipal affairs. See Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913).
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from imposing a moratorium on expansion of cable television in the
city. The city argued that the home rule provision contained in the
state constitution conferred Parker immunity. The Supreme Court
rejected this notion, finding that the Colorado Home Rule Amend-
ment's "'guarantee of local autonomy'" did not provide the
" 'clear[ly] articulat[ed] and affirmative[ly] express[ed]'" state policy
necessary to immunize the anticompetitive acts in issue.1 35
Because Midcal involved a private defendant, the Court did not ad-
dress whether the challenged ordinance could meet the second prong
of the test announced in Midcal: active state supervision. 36 It is cer-
tain, however, that if "the State's position is one of mere neutrality
respecting the municipal actions challeged as anticompetitive" no
state action immunity is conferred. 3 7
C. The Future of the State Action Doctrine and Its Impact on
Municipal Antitrust Liability
The lower courts' interpretations of Boulder have been varied, but
a pattern has appeared in favor of finding municipal immunity under
a wide variety of circumstances.' 3 8 These courts have inferred a
state's willingness to accept the anticompetitive results of authorized
municipal activities. This view of finding implicit state authority to
135. 455 U.S. at 54-56.
136. The plurality in Lafayette quoted the "active state supervision" language of
Bates, but did not apply the test. 435 U.S. at 410. See Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for
"State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435, 445 n.50 (1981).
137. Id, at 55 (emphasis in original).
138. See, e.g., Tom Hudson & Assoc., Inc. v. Chula Vista, 746 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.
1984) (California law approved granting of exclusive trash collection contracts by mu-
nicipalities); Catalina Cablevision Ass'n v. Tucson, 745 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1984) (state
-of Arizona provided a clear and affirmative state policy to displace competition in the
cable television industry); Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc., v. Department of Transp., 745
F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1984) (executive branch of Hawaii entitled to state action immunity
in awarding of exclusive currency exchange concession at airport); Springs Ambulance
Serv., Inc. v. Rancho Mirage, 745 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1984) (three desert cities could
provide free ambulance service, thereby displacing competition, because state statute
so allowed); Central Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency,
715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983) (state authorization to issue revenue bonds to fund a solid
waste disposal site conferred immunity for anticompetitive actions required to market
bonds); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983)
(immunity found by focusing on fact that state itself had regulated ambulance services
in a manner that evidences an intent to displace competition); Hopkinsville Cable TV
v. Pennroyal, No. 81-0270-P(G) (W.D. Ky. March. 11, 1982) (state constitutional provi-
sion granting the municipality power to control and franchise utilities constituted clear
articulation of state policy authorizing an exclusive franchise).
resort to violations of the Sherman Act in order to attain an explicit
legislative goal seems to stretch Boulder beyond recognition.
The bounds of municipal antitrust immunity have been clarified
greatly by the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau C7aire.139 In that case, four Wisconsin
townships sued an adjacent city that had the only sewage treatment
facility available to the towns.1 40 The city refused to supply sewage
treatment services to the towns unless they agreed to annexation.
There was no dispute that this conduct constituted an illegal monop-
oly; the issue was whether the city's conduct was exempt from the
Sherman Act.
The court of appeals ruled in favor of the city, reasoning that "[i]f
the state authorizes certain conduct, we can infer that it condones the
anticompetitive effect that is a reasonable or foreseeable consequence
of engaging in the authorized activity."' 4 ' The court refused to apply
the second prong of the test enunciated in Midcal: active state
supervision.i42
On certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the Court af-
firmed the decision of the lower courts, finding that immunity did at-
tach.143 The Court held that the Wisconsin statutes evidenced a
clearly articulated state policy to displace competition with regula-
tion in the area of municipal provision of sewage services. 144 The de-
cision is important because it answers several questions that the
Boulder Court left open.
First, the decision makes clear that state action immunity can exist
even if the state legislature has not stated explicitly that it expects
the municipality to engage in anticompetitive conduct.4 5 The test is
whether a state statute "has delegated to the cities the express au-
thority to take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive
effects."'146 In the instant case, the Court found it sufficient that the
state had authorized the defendant City to provide sewage services
and to determine the geographical area it would serve.' 47
Second, the Court dispelled the belief, held by hopeful plaintiffs'
attorneys, that before the "clear articulation" requirement can be
met by a defendant, it must show that the state "compelled" the act
139. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
140. Id
141. 700 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 383-84. The court expressed concern that if the active state supervision
test were applied to cities, "[s]tates would be required to supervise all local actions
.Id at 384.
143. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
144. Id at 1719.
145. Id. at 1718.
146. Id. at 1719.
147. Id at 1718.
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in question.148 The Court pointed out that Cantor149 and Goldfarb150
were distinguishable because those cases concerned private parties,
not cities. 151 The Court reasoned that a municipality is an arm of the
state,152 and that if it is acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy, nothing more need be shown "to prove that the challenged
practice constitutes state action."5 3
Finally, the Court held that "the active state supervision require-
ment should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a munici-
pality."'154 It is in the discussion of this part of the decision that the
Court, in dictum, leaves the judicial door open to an antitrust chal-
lenge to rent control. The Court stated that the active state supervi-
sion test will only apply to a private defendant, because "there is a
real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than
the governmental interests of the State."'155 The Court reasoned that
there was little chance of a municipality becoming involved in non-
governmental activities. The Supreme Court did recognize, however,
the danger that the municipality would "seek to further purely paro-
chial public interests at the expense of more overriding state
goals."156 The Court thought this danger minimal, nevertheless, be-
cause of the "clearly articulated state policy" test. 5 7
The point is that rent control exists in fifty-one California munici-
palities without any state policy concerning rent control, and cer-
tainly nothing "clearly articulated." Parochial interests are served to
the exclusion of the broader state interest in maintaining the supply
of rental housing.158 In fact, every time the California Legislature
considers a bill to limit the "radical" rent control ordinances, the af-
fected cities lobby heavily, stating that the state should stay out of lo-
148. Id. at 1720.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
151. 105 S. Ct. at 1720.
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id (footnote omitted).
155. Id
156. Id at 1721 (emphasis added).
157. Id
158. The California legislature has expressed a policy in favor of the free market in
housing:
The Legislature finds and declares that the subject of housing is of vital
statewide importance to the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of this
state, for the following reasons:
(c) A healthy housing market is one in which residents of this state have a
cal affairs. Perhaps the time will come when these cities understand
that they cannot maintain a price-fixing scheme in flagrant disregard
of federal law without the protection of state concurrence.
Factually, the Town of Hallie decision has little in common with an
antitrust suit attacking rent control. The Wisconsin case involved a
section two (monopolization) violation, while rent control constitutes
primarily a section one (restraint of trade) violation. The City of Eau
Claire was acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to dis-
place competition; no such state policy exists in California with re-
spect to rent control. Lastly, sewage treatment is a well-recognized,
traditional function of local government, whereas only a very few cit-
ies nationally have ever placed ceilings on rent levels. Town of Hal-
lie v. City of Eau Claire will perhaps make overcoming the state
action immunity defense more difficult in many cases. It does not
represent, however, a change in direction for the Court, but rather a
clarification of earlier decisions.
D. Implications for Rent Control
The post-Boulder decisions taken together seem to suggest that
courts are unwilling to attach antitrust liability to traditional munici-
pal functions. 159 Where immunity claims have been rejected, it is
usually because the city defendant fails to convince the court that the
challenged activity is necessary to carry out a proper governmental
function.160
In Mason City Center Associates v. City of Mason City,161 a shop-
ping mall developer challenged an agreement in which competing de-
velopers agreed to develop a downtown mall on the condition that
the city block other developments. The court rejected the city's
claim that the state's grant of zoning authority immunized its activi-
ties. The court noted that zoning was by nature anticompetitive but
stated:
To say that the Iowa legislature may have foreseen that the zoning statute,
choice of housing opportunities and one in which the housing consumer may
effectively choose within the free marketplace.
(d) A healthy housing market is necessary both to achieve a healthy state
economy and to avoid an unacceptable level of unemployment.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50001 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 872 (1983) (city immune in dealing with airport operators
because activities were "public, governmental functions").
160. It should be recalled that Chief Justice Burger's crucial fifth vote in Lafayette
depended on his view that the activity complained of was "not an integral operation in
the area of traditional government functions." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 424 (Bur-
ger, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
161. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982). Accord
Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983).
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when otherwise properly applied by the municipalities, might result in an-
ticompetitive effects is not to say that it therefore also affirmatively contem-
plated and approved direct anticompetitive activity violative of the federal
antitrust laws.
1 6 2
Mason City indicates that perhaps the courts will not grant antitrust
immunity to a city activity that constitutes, for example, a clear ex-
ample of price-fixing.
For antitrust plaintiffs seeking to invalidate a rent control law, the
state action exemption should not pose major problems. Rent control
has not been "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" as
state policy in California. 16 3 It is possible that a court could judi-
cially find the requisite state policy in landlord/tenant legislation,
housing statutes, or even in a court decision.164 Nevertheless, such a
judicial determination would violate the spirit of Boulder and Lafay-
ette if not the letter of the law.165
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Fisher v. City of Berkeley
The question of whether the Sherman Act preempts a local rent
control ordinance by virtue of the supremacy clause6e was raised on
appeal in Fisher v. City of Berkeley.167 The case involved a facial at-
tack by plaintiff landlords on the Berkeley rent control scheme. The
antitrust issue was raised by an amicus curiae for the plaintiffs dur-
ing briefing in the California Supreme Court. 168 The majority's
lengthy discourse on the issue, Chief Justice Bird's concurring opin-
ion addressing whether the court should have entertained the issue,
162. 468 F. Supp. at 743 n.7.
163. California Government Code section 65589(b) provides that none of the accom-
panying statutes regulating housing elements are to be construed as affirming or deny-
ing a city's authority to impose rent controls. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589(b) (West
1983). This is obviously a neutral declaration concerning rent controls. See Cantor, 428
U.S. at 592-93.
164. However, the plurality in Lafayette only contemplated that the state policy
would come from statutes showing that the "legislature contemplated the kind of ac-
tion complained of." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415.
165. Currently pending in the California Legislature, Assembly Bill No. 483
(Costa), would mandate "vacancy decontrol of rents in all state localities with rent
control laws." The bill does not express a state policy in favor of rent control.
166. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
167. Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984).
168. The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Bird examines whether the court
should have entertained the issue. Id. at 710-13, 693 P.2d at 312-15, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
733-35 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
and the fact that the dissent by Justice Lucas deals exclusively with
the antitrust issue, reveal the importance of the matter.
The majority's analysis of the antitrust issues in Fisher was disap-
pointing because it left unanswered the questions it could have ex-
plored and perhaps provided insight into, such as whether a
conspiracy could be proved under the circumstances. The opinion be-
gins with a discussion of the facial validity of the ordinance under
section one of the Sherman Act.16 9 One is alerted to the type of
"question begging" in the majority's analysis when the court declares
that "if unbending application of traditional standards would prove
too inflexible to accommodate legitimate governmental objectives
that motivate municipal regulation, we will not hesitate to cautiously
depart from traditional rules."170 This statement is valuable because
it not only signals the court's decision on the antitrust issue, but in-
forms the reader that if application of antitrust principles would in-
validate the rent control ordinance, the court will elect not to use
those principles. In other words, the court's actual discussion of the
issues had to sidestep settled antitrust precedent to reach the desired
outcome. Therefore, potential defendant municipalities should ex-
pect that plaintiffs will be encouraged to file suit in federal court.
The majority set forth the antitrust precedents in a straightfor-
ward, honest manner. In discussing the per se rule, the opinion
states that if a combination's purpose is price-fixing, "[t]he machinery
employed. . . is immaterial."171 It also correctly stated that "courts
have mechanically declared such conduct illegal,"172 not caring
whether consumers realized a net benefit. Given the obvious out-
come of this line of reasoning when applied in the rent control con-
text, the court then hastily retreated, stating that "[iun our view,
maximum rents price fixing, implemented by local government, is
simply not of the same character as price fixing among private busi-
ness defendants."173
The court quickly turned to the alternative: the Rule of Reason.
Again, the court's summary of the state of the law was flawless, re-
lating that the public welfare argument has been laid to rest and that
now the proper inquiry is "'the challenged restraint's impact on com-
petitive conditions.' "174 The court's departure from the law it had
given was marked by its statement that "[a]s stated above, however,
169. Id at 660, 693 P.2d at 275, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
170. Id. at 664, 693 P.2d at 278, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
171. Id. at 666, 693 P.2d at 279, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. at 223).
172. Id.
173. 37 Cal. 3d at 670, 693 P.2d at 283, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (footnote omitted).
174. Id at 672, 693 P.2d at 284, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 705 (quoting National Soc'y of Prof.
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)).
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we will not mechanically apply to municipal defendants rules of law
developed exclusively in the context of determining private business
antitrust liability."'175
The court called for development of a public welfare defense to al-
leged antitrust violations by local governments. 176 It then completely
scuttled eighty years of common law antitrust development and de-
clared a new standard of liability "modeled after the [United States
Supreme] court's commerce clause cases"'17 7 for judging a conflict be-
tween the antitrust laws and a municipal ordinance. The fait accom-
pli occurred when the court discarded the cost-benefit balancing test
used in commerce clause decisions.178 The test proposed and utilized
by the court states that a municipal regulation with a proper local
purpose, rationally related to use of the police power, operating in an
even-handed manner, will be upheld against an antitrust attack un-
less a method less intrusive on federal antitrust policies is proved by
the plaintiff. The end result of the application of the court's test was
a finding that plaintiffs had not established a conflict with the Sher-
man Act.179
Justice Lucas' dissenting opinion bears noting, because at the time
of oral argument in the Fisher case, he had only recently left the fed-
eral bench to accept a position on the state's highest court. His dis-
sent concluded that "a municipality's participation . .. in a price-
fixing scheme should not shield it from antitrust scrutiny,"' 8 0 and
therefore the ordinance was a per se illegal violation of the Sherman
Act. Not only did Justice Lucas reach this conclusion, he went one
step further and reached that rare plateau which many dissenters
strive for but few obtain: he used the majority's own test to support
his opinion. He gave the majority three less intrusive means to ac-
complish the goal of reducing rents.' 8 ' First, rent subsidies could be
provided to those who deserve them. Second, the city could erect
public housing projects. Third, the city could acquire property
through negotiated purchase or condemnation. All three would avoid
conflict with the Sherman Act and would spread the financial burden
for low-income housing among all city taxpayers and not just owners
of rental property.
175. Id,
176. 37 Cal. 3d at 673, 693 P.2d at 285, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
177. 1& at 675, 693 P.2d at 286, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
178. 1d
179. 1& at 678, 693 P.2d at 289, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
180. Id, at 714, 693 P.2d at 315, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 736 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 718, 693 P.2d at 318, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
At the time of this article's printing, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Fisher. This portends some direction
from the Court concerning rent control's legality. Although one can-
not predict whether the courts will focus upon the antitrust aspects
of the case, this will be a topic of debate for years to come. It is likely
that the Fisher decision will interest jurists for the simple reason
that it represents an aberration: a state's highest court entering the
heretofore exclusive realm of the federal judiciary and attempting to
modify the established principles of antitrust law. It is an attempt
that will be rejected as long as economists agree that the setting of
maximum rent ceilings by the government is a disaster,18 2 and our
courts uphold the idea that the operation of the free market will pro-
duce the greatest benefit for our citizenry.
B. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
The Clayton Antitrust Act183 provides that anyone who is injured
by reason of a federal antitrust violation may sue in federal court and
can recover treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees. 8 4 One of
the greatest conceptual difficulties with the current rush to sue mu-
nicipalities in antitrust is the potential for devastating damage
awards. One public official's decision to award an exclusive contract,
for example, could result in millions of dollars of damages being
awarded against the city. The local taxpayers would then be forced
to bear the burden of paying the award. This has led many legal
scholars to believe that judges would simply be unwilling to award
such damages, 8 5 the end result being that municipalities would be
free to violate the antitrust laws.
There will be very little debate concerning this issue in the future
because Congress has made an initial step toward resolving this issue
by passing of the "Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984."186 The
statute provides that "[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or at-
torney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clay-
ton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, or 15c) from any local government, or
official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity."'187 The im-
plications in the rent control context are obvious. No monetary dam-
182. See, e.g., Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law, 69 COR-
NELL L. REV. 517 (1984).
183. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-21, 22-27 (1976).
184. Id. § 15.
185. Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: Litigation
Strategies, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1983). See, e.g., Note, Home Rule and the
Sherman Act After Boulder: Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 259 (1983); Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to Municipal Activities, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 518 (1979).
186. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984).
187. Id. § 3(a).
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ages or attorney fees may be recovered by the plaintiffs. Therefore,
only injunctive relief'8 8 is available to those plaintiffs who had not
filed by the effective date of the Act. 8 9
The passage of the Act should not be condemned by plaintiffs con-
sidering antitrust challenges to local rent control ordinances because
money damages are not the central goal in such a suit. Rather, it is
the invalidation of the offending law that is the aim, as it was in
Fisher. Moreover, the "Local Government Antitrust Act" is impor-
tant because of what it does not do. It does not grant local govern-
ments immunity from the federal antitrust laws. Implicit in this
omission is the "green light" to plaintiffs who wish to seek injunctive
relief against the anticompetitive conduct of local governments. Os-
tensibly, this includes the fixing of maximum rent ceilings by cities
and counties.
VI. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
There are several obstacles to proving an antitrust cause of action
against a municipality that has imposed rent controls. Perhaps the
most difficult will be finding a judge who is willing to preempt a
city's entire rent control scheme. The federal courts have consis-
tently validated legislative schemes for stabilizing prices on various
commodities,190 and it could be an arduous task to convince them
that rent control is a per se violation of section one of the Sherman
Act.
The plaintiff's main burden will be proving a conspiracy to violate
the antitrust laws by restraining competition in the rental housing
market. The most difficult hurdle will be the Noerr doctrine's ex-
emption for political activity. As discussed in Overton v. City of
Berkeley,191 a conspiracy among the tenants themselves or between
the city and unwilling landlords would circumvent Noerr problems.
The state action exemption is less bothersome for now. Either the
immunity exists or it does not. And, ,in California at least, there is no
state policy in favor of rent control at the local level. If the state leg-
islature does not enact a statute stating that rent control is the policy
188. Injunctive relief is provided for in the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
189. The Act provides that "[s]ubsection (a) shall not apply with respect to cases
commenced before the effective date [September 24, 1984] of this Act." Pub. L. No. 98-
544, § 3(b).
190. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The holdings in these cases were
not based on antitrust grounds.
191. No. C843364SAW (N.D. Cal. filed May 31, 1984).
of the state, a rent control challenge on antitrust grounds not filed
before that date would be dismissed.
A Sherman Act section two (monopolization) cause of action
should also be pleaded. This avoids the conspiracy problem because a
single entity may violate section two. It is doubtful that a court will
find that any rent control agency has in fact "monopolized" a city's
housing market. Strong evidence, however, should be presented on
this issue, pointing out the fact that the local rent board does have
the power to exclude competition. The "old" property owners, un-
able to obtain a return on their investment, are forced by the law to
sell to "new" owners at a distressed price. Thus, the city becomes a
partner of every buyer. There is usually little or no new construction
in most rent controlled areas, even if the law exempts new housing
from its operation. This also contributes to the city's monopoly
power over rental housing.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fisher should con-
tain many insights into the unanswered questions about local rent
control laws' vulnerability to attack on federal antitrust grounds.
The progress of the Overton 192 antitrust challenge to Berkeley's rent
control law will also be enlightening. The law in this area is evolving
rapidly. For the time being, it is certain that the federal antitrust
laws provide a viable avenue of attack against the economic debacle
known as rent control.
192. Id.
